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Preface
This little book contains the course that I had the pleasure of giving at
the Eighth Estonian Winter School in Computer Science (EWSCS ’03) held
at the beautiful Park Hotel Palmse in Lahemaa National Park, Estonia,
from March 2nd through 7th, 2003. There I gave four 90-minute lectures on
algorithmic information theory (AIT), which is the theory of program-size
complexity. Each of these lectures is one chapter of this book.
In these lectures I discuss philosophical applications of AIT, not practical
applications. Indeed, I believe AIT has no practical applications.
The most interesting thing about AIT is that you can almost never deter-
mine the complexity of anything. This makes the theory useless for practical
applications, but fascinating from a philosophical point of view, because it
shows that there are limits to knowledge.
Most work on computational complexity is concerned with time. However
this course will try to show that program-size complexity, which measures
algorithmic information, is of much greater philosophical significance. I’ll
discuss how one can use this complexity measure to study what can and
cannot be achieved by formal axiomatic mathematical theories.
In particular, I’ll show (a) that there are natural information-theoretic
constraints on formal axiomatic theories, and that program-size complexity
provides an alternative path to incompleteness from the one originally used
by Kurt Go¨del. Furthermore, I’ll show (b) that in pure mathematics there
are mathematical facts that are true for no reason, that are true by accident.
These have to do with determining the successive binary digits of the precise
numerical value of the halting probability Ω for a “self-delimiting” universal
Turing machine.
I believe that these meta-theorems (a,b) showing (a) that the complexity
of axiomatic theories can be characterized information-theoretically and (b)
that God plays dice in pure mathematics, both strongly suggest a quasi-
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empirical view of mathematics. I.e., math is different from physics, but
perhaps not as different as people usually think.
I’ll also discuss the convergence of theoretical computer science with the-
oretical physics, Leibniz’s ideas on complexity, Stephen Wolfram’s book A
New Kind of Science, and how to attempt to use information theory to define
what a living being is.
In this book I’ve tried to preserve the informal style of presentation in my
lectures that stressed the key ideas and methods and avoided getting bogged
down in technical details. There are no proofs here, but there are plenty of
proof sketches. I hope that you enjoy reading this book just as much as I
enjoyed presenting this material at EWSCS ’03!
—Gregory Chaitin
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin
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Chapter 1
Day I—Philosophical Necessity
of AIT
1.1 Is P 6= NP a New Axiom?
Can we add P 6= NP as a new axiom?!
This is a good example of the situation discussed in Go¨del, What is Can-
tor’s Continuum Problem?, 1947, where he argues that maybe math is a
little like physics and that new axioms that are not self-evident might be
justified because of their usefulness.
If so, there is ample pragmatic justification for adding P 6= NP as a new
axiom.
(In his 1947 article Go¨del was concerned with set theory, not computer
science.)
Let’s see!!!
1.2 Day I Summary
• Our goal: To find the Limits of Mathematical Reasoning
• Tool we’ll use: Program-Size Complexity
• It’s also called: Algorithmic Information
• Idea starts with Leibniz! 1686!
Discourse on Metaphysics (in French!)
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• AIT is needed to understand what is “law” and
what is “understanding.”
1.3 Summary of Leibniz, 1686
(Brought to my attention by Hermann Weyl, 1932.1)
What is a law of nature?
According to Leibniz, a theory must be simpler than the data it explains!
Because if a physical law can be as complicated as the experi-
mental data that it explains, then there is always a law, and the
notion of “law” becomes meaningless!
Understanding is compression! A theory as complicated as the data it
explains is NO theory!
All of this is stated very clearly (in French) in 1686 by the mathematical
genius and philosopher Leibniz! During his lifetime he only transmitted sum-
maries of these ideas to friends and colleagues in letters! The complete text
of his Discourse on Metaphysics was found among his voluminous personal
papers after his death.2
1.4 From Leibniz to AIT
AIT goes beyond Leibniz by positing that a theory is a computer pro-
gram, and that the size in bits of this computer program is the com-
plexity of the theory. AIT makes Leibniz more precise! AIT emphasizes
the common features in these four diagrams:
scientific theory −→ Calculations −→ experimental data
program −→ Computer −→ output
axioms −→ Deduction −→ theorems
Ideas −→ Mind of God −→ The World
1Hermann Weyl, The Open World, Yale University Press, 1932. Reprinted by Ox Bow
Press, 1989. See also Weyl’s Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science, Princeton
University Press, 1949.
2For the original French text, see Leibniz, Discours de me´taphysique, Gallimard, 1995.
There is an English translation in G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, edited and trans-
lated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Hackett, 1989.
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Following Leibniz, in each of these diagrams the input on the
left must be much smaller than the output on the right.
Leibniz’s key insight is not that this is “the best of all possible worlds”.
This was anti-Leibniz propaganda by Voltaire, who ridiculed Leibniz and did
not understand how subtle and profound Leibniz was. (According to Borges,
the word “optimism” was invented by Voltaire to mock Leibniz!)
Leibniz’s key insight is that God has used few ideas to create all the diver-
sity, richness and apparent complexity of the natural world.3 Leibniz is ac-
tually affirming his belief that the universe is rationally comprehensible.
(This belief in a rational universal goes back at least to the ancient Greeks,
particularly Pythagoras and Plato, but Leibniz’s formulation is much sharper
and profound because he analyzes in mathematical terms exactly what this
belief means.) In modern language, Leibniz was stating his belief in the
possibility of science.
Pythagoras and Plato believed that the universe can be comprehended
using mathematics. Leibniz went beyond them by clarifying mathematically
what exactly does it mean to assert that the universe can be comprehended
using mathematics.
AIT continues this train of thought and goes beyond Leibniz by posit-
ing that explanations are computer programs and also by defining precisely
what complexity is and what exactly does it mean to satisfy Leibniz’s re-
quirement that an explanation has to be simpler than the phenomena
that it explains.
1.5 Setup for Discussing the Limits of Math-
ematical Reasoning
Now let’s apply these ideas! Let’s see what they have to say about the
limits of mathematical reasoning. Let’s see what mathematical theories can
accomplish.
The setup is as follows.
3Here is an argument in favor of diversity from Leibniz via Borges. Consider two
libraries with exactly the same number of books. Recall that Borges was a librarian! One
of the libraries only has copies of Virgil’s Aeneid (presumably the perfect book), while
the other library has one copy of the Aeneid and many other different (and presumably
inferior!) books. Nevertheless, the second library is clearly a more interesting place to
visit!
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The (static, formal) mathematical theories that we consider are thought
of, somewhat abstractly, as a computer program for running through all
possible proofs and generating all the theorems in the theory, which are
precisely all the logical consequences of the axioms in the theory.
Theory = Program −→ Computer −→ Theorems
[This assumes that the theory uses a formal language, symbolic logic,
requires complete proofs, and provides a proof-checking algorithm that al-
ways enables you to decide mechanically whether or not a proof is correct,
whether or not it followed all the rules in deriving a logical consequence of
the axioms.]
And we shall concentrate our attention on the size in bits of this com-
puter program for generating all the theorems. That’s our measure of the
complexity of this theory, that’s our measure of its information content.
So when we speak of anN -bit theory, we mean one with anN -bit program
for generating all the theorems. We don’t care that this process is very slow
and never terminates. AIT is a theoretical theory, not a practical theory!
Okay, that’s half the setup! These are the theories we’ll consider.
Here’s the other half of the setup. Here are the theorems that we want
these theories to be able to establish. We want to use these theories to prove
that particular computer programs are elegant.
“Elegant” Programs:
No smaller program gives exactly the same output.
What is an elegant program? It’s one with the property that no smaller
program written in the same language produces exactly the same output.4
There are lots of elegant programs!
For any particular computational task, for any particular output that we
desire to achieve, there has to be at least one elegant program, and there
may even be several.
But what if we want to be able to prove that a particular program is
elegant?
4Throughout this discussion we assume a fixed choice of programming language.
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1.6 You need an N-bit theory to prove that
an N-bit program is elegant!
[For the proof, see Section 1.8; for a corollary, see Section 1.7.]
These are Irreducible Mathematical Truths!!!
No rational justification is possible!
Such mathematical facts can have no rational explanation, because ra-
tional explanation consists of reducing something to simpler (maybe even
self-evident) principles. A theory for something derives it from simpler hy-
potheses. If this kind of reduction is impossible, then we are confronted with
irrational mathematical facts, mathematical facts that cannot be encom-
passed by any static theory!
Therefore (corollary). . .
1.7 Complexity of the Universe of Mathemat-
ical Ideas
The world of mathematical ideas has INFINITE complexity!
Why?
Well, no N -bit theory for any finite N can enable you to prove all true
assertions of the form
“This particular program is elegant.”
(What about the physical world? Does it have finite or infinite complex-
ity? We’ll look at that later. See Sections 1.10 through 1.12.)
1.8 Why do you need an N-bit theory to prove
that an N-bit program is elegant?
Here is the proof! We’ll assume the opposite and derive a contradiction.
Consider this computer program:
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N -bit theory + fixed-size routine
↓
Computer
↓
the output of
the first provably elegant program whose size is greater than
(complexity of theory + size of fixed-size routine)
Let c be the size in bits of the fixed-size routine that does all this: It is
given the N -bit theory as data and then it runs through all possible proofs in
the theory until it finds a provably elegant program that is sufficiently large
(> N + c bits), then it runs that program and returns that large elegant
program’s output as its own output.
So the N + c bit program displayed above produces the same output
as a provably elegant program that is larger than N + c bits. But that is
impossible!
So our precise result is that an N-bit theory cannot enable us to
prove that any program that is larger than N + c bits is elegant.
Here c is the size in bits of the fixed-size routine that when added to the
N -bit formal theory as above yields the paradox that proves our theorem.
Note: We are making the tacit assumption that if our theory proves that
a program is elegant, then that program is actually elegant. I.e., we assume
that only true theorems are provable in our formal theory. If this is NOT
the case, then the theory is of absolutely no interest.
1.9 Is Mathematics Quasi-Empirical?
Now let’s go back to the question of adding P 6= NP as a new axiom,
and to Go¨del’s thoughts that maybe physics and math are not so different,
which, following Lakatos and Tymoczko (1998), is now referred to as a quasi-
empirical view of mathematics.
Go¨del, who had the conventional Platonist view of math, was only forced
into backing new math axioms that are only justified pragmatically
just as in physics because of his famous 1931 incompleteness theorem. And I
believe that the ideas that I’ve just presented applying program-size complex-
ity to incompleteness, in particular my result that it takes an N -bit theory
to prove that an N -bit program is elegant, and the results on Ω that we’ll see
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Day II, provide even more support for Go¨del’s heretical views on new
axioms.
The way AIT measures the complexity (information content) of mathe-
matical theories makes Go¨del incompleteness seem much more natural, much
more pervasive, much more inevitable, and much more dangerous. Adding
new axioms—adding more mathematical information—seems to be the only
way out, the only way to go forward!
We’ve discussed adding new axioms in math just as in physics, pragmat-
ically. A related question is
“Is experimental mathematics okay?”
Even when there are NO proofs? For an extreme example of this, see
Wolfram, A New Kind of Science, 2002, who provides a tremendous amount
of computational evidence, but almost no proofs, in support of his theory.
See also the journal Experimental Mathematics.
Obviously, AIT makes me sympathetic to experimental mathematics,
even though I don’t do experimental math myself. Experimental math is fu-
eled by the power of the computer, not by Go¨del’s nor by my meta-theorems,
but it fits nicely into a quasi-empirical view of mathematics. Practical ne-
cessity as well as philosophical analysis are both simultaneously pushing in
the direction of experimental math!
1.10 Complexity of the Physical World
Now let’s turn to the physical universe! Does it have finite or infinite com-
plexity?
The conventional view on this held by high-energy physicists is that there
is a TOE, a theory of everything, a finite set of laws of nature that we may
someday know, which has only finite complexity.
So that part is optimistic!
But unfortunately in quantum mechanics there’s randomness, God plays
dice, and to know the results of all God’s coin tosses, infinitely many coin
tosses, necessitates a theory of infinite complexity, which simply records the
result of each toss!
So the conventional view currently held by physicists is that because of
randomness in quantum mechanics the world has infinite complexity.
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Could the conventional view be wrong? Might it nevertheless be the case
that the universe only has finite complexity? Some extremely interesting
thoughts on this can be found in
Wolfram, A New Kind of Science, 2002.
According to Wolfram, there is no real randomness. There is only
pseudo-randomness, like the randomness produced by random-number
generators, which are actually deterministic sequences of numbers governed
by mathematical laws, since computers use algorithms to generate pseudo-
random numbers, they don’t use quantum mechanics!
According to Wolfram, our universe is actually a deterministic uni-
verse that’s governed by deterministic physical laws!
So the physical universe, the world, has finite complexity. According
to Wolfram, everything happens for a reason, just as Leibniz thought!
These two supremely intelligent men are rationalists. They want to un-
derstand everything! They don’t believe in ultimate mysteries! They don’t
think anything is incomprehensible! They believe in the power of the human
mind to comprehend everything!
On the other hand, we have seen that because it has infinite
complexity, the universe of mathematical ideas CANNOT be com-
prehended in its entirety.
1.11 Summary of Wolfram, 2002
In summary, according to Wolfram, 2002 the world is like pi = 3.1415926. . .
It looks complicated,5 but it is actually very simple!
According to Wolfram all the randomness we see in the physical world is
actually pseudo-randomness. He believes that the physical world is actually
deterministic, we just don’t know the law.
He sees this as a philosophical possibility. Whether our physical
universe is actually that way or not is another matter, to be decided by
scientists, not philosophers!
5Especially if you’re given successive digits of pi that come from far inside the decimal
expansion without being told that they’re digits of pi—they look random.
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1.12 Digital Philosophy
Wolfram’s book as well as my own work on AIT are both examples of what
Edward Fredkin refers to as digital philosophy, a viewpoint that Fredkin
also helped to pioneer.6
In a nutshell, digital philosophy posits that the world is a giant computer,
a giant digital information processor, and that, fundamentally, everything
is discrete 0/1 bits!
This algorithmic view of everything7 works much better if there are ac-
tually no real numbers, no continuous quantities, and the physical universe
is really, at some bottom level, discrete.
Wolfram’s work, AIT, and Fredkin’s digital philosophy are all examples
of the convergence of mathematics, theoretical physics, and theo-
retical computer science! This is an accelerating trend, of which the field
of quantum computing is also an example.
Of course, traditional mathematical physics is based on continuous math,
on ordinary and partial differential equations, and does not fit in too well
with a digital philosophy. Maybe digital philosophy is a terrible mistake.
Maybe we are taking the digital computer much too seriously! Maybe we
shouldn’t make it the basis of a new philosophy, of a new world view, of a
new syste`me du monde?
We will see!
1.13 Two Interesting Books
I should mention that besides my own works, the book on the quasi-empirical
view of math is
Tymoczko,
New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics,
Princeton University Press, 1998.
6For more on Wolfram, Fredkin, Lloyd, Toffoli, Landauer, Zuse. . . see O. Postel-Vinay,
“L’Univers est-il un calculateur?” [Is the universe a calculator?], La Recherche, no. 360,
January 2003, pp. 33–44.
7Algorithms played a decisive role in Sumerian mathematics more than a millennium
before Pythagoras, a tremendously long intellectual trajectory! The Sumerians used base
60 numerals, and divided the circle into 360 degrees.—Franc¸oise Chaitin-Chatelin, private
communication.
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This is the second expanded edition of a valuable collection of essays by
philosophers, mathematicians, and computer scientists (including two of my
own essays) that its editor Tymoczko unfortunately did not live to see in
print.
Highly recommended!
There is also a forthcoming book on experimental math,
Bailey (and Borwein?),
The Experimental Mathematician,
A. K. Peters, 2003?,
that should be extremely interesting.
1.14 Decomposing the World
Finally, here is a new and completely different philosophical application of
AIT.
What is a living being?
How can we partition the world into parts? Can we do this in spite of
Parmenides and mystics who insist that the world must be apprehended as a
whole and is an organic unity, a single substance, and cannot be separated
into independent parts?
I think the key is algorithmic independence.
X and Y are said to be algorithmically independent if the program-size
complexity of X and Y ≈ the sum of the individual program-size complexi-
ties of X and Y .
I.e., if the number of bits in the simplest theory that explains both si-
multaneously is approximately equal to the sum of the number of bits in the
simplest theories that explain each of them separately.
Independent parts of the world, of which living beings are the most in-
teresting example, have the property that their program-size complexity de-
composes additively.
Conversely, the parts of a living being are certainly not independent
and have high mutual information. [Mutual information will be discussed
in Sections 3.6 and 3.7, Day III, and Section 4.3, Day IV.]
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This needs much more work!
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Chapter 2
Day II—Main Application of
AIT: Incompleteness
2.1 Day II Summary
Limits of Formal Mathematical Reasoning:
I. You can’t prove a number is uninteresting/random.
II. You can’t determine bits of Ω (accidental mathematical facts).
Both I and II are irreducible mathematical truths!
2.2 Hilbert-Style Formal Theories
• Meta-mathematics: Use mathematics to discover the limits of math-
ematics. Cannot be applied to intuitive, informal mathematics.
• What’s a formal theory?
– axioms
– rules of inference
– symbolic logic
– formal grammar
There is a proof-checking algorithm!
19
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• There is algorithm for generating all theorems in size order of proofs!
So, following Emil Post, 1944, formal theory = r.e. set of propositions:
theory −→ Computer −→ theorems
• This is a static view of mathematics! It is assumed that the axioms
and rules of inference don’t change. Mathematical methods can be
used to discuss what such a formal system can achieve.
2.3 Summary of Go¨del, 1931
• “This statement is false!”
• True iff false! Paradox!
• “This statement is unprovableFT !”
• True iff unprovableFT ! Therefore either a false statement is provableFT ,
and FT is useless, or a true statement is unprovableFT , and FT is
incomplete!
• FT = Formal Theory.
2.4 My Approach to Incompleteness
• Let’s assume we can divide all the positive integers into the interest-
ing and the uninteresting ones, and that infinitely many of them are
uninteresting.
• Consider the first uninteresting positive integer!
• It’s ipso facto interesting! Paradox!
• Consider the first provablyFT uninteresting positive integer!
• It cannot exist because it would be an extremely interesting number!
Therefore FT is incomplete! FT can never prove that a number is
uninteresting! [Actually, it will turn out, almost never.]
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• How do we actually define an uninteresting number? Uninteresting
means algorithmically irreducible, incompressible, no theory for it smaller
than it is.1
• Final Conclusion: Infinitely many integers are uninteresting. But
using a fixed FT you can almost never prove it! Only in finitely many
cases!2
2.5 Borel’s Unreal Number B, 1927
Let’s start on the path to the halting probability Ω, which is a real number.
• Start with Borel’s very unreal real number B.
• The original source is E´mile Borel, 1927.3
B was brought to my attention by Vladimir Tasic´, 2001.4
• B = 0.d1d2d3 . . .
• The Nth digit dN of B answers the Nth question in French!
• dN =
1 −→ answer Yes!
2 −→ answer No!
0 −→ NO ANSWER
(Nth text in French is not a valid yes/no question,
or cannot be answered.)
• Most digits of Borel’s number B are 0’s. B is extremely redundant!
1I.e., using notation that we haven’t introduced yet, the positive integer N is uninter-
esting iff H(N) ≡ HU (N) ≥ |N | ≡ size in bits of N . For the definition of HU , see Section
2.13.
2It turns out that if you work through all the details, you can’t prove that a positive
integer is uninteresting if its size in bits is greater than (the size of the program that
generates all the theorems in the formal theory FT ) plus a constant c.
3In English in Paolo Mancosu, From Brouwer to Hilbert, Oxford University Press, 1998.
4Vladimir Tasic´,Mathematics and the Roots of Postmodern Thought, Oxford University
Press, 2001.
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2.6 More-Real Turing Number T
Here is the next step on our path to Ω:
• Real Number T Solving Turing’s Halting Problem
• T = 0.b1b2b3 . . .
• The Nth bit bN of T answers the Nth case of the halting problem.
bN tells us whether the Nth program pN ever halts.
• bN =
0 −→ pN doesn’t halt,
1 −→ pN halts.
2.7 Some Interesting Cases of the Halting Prob-
lem
These are bits of T :
• Fermat’s Last Theorem (Andrew Wiles)
Does
xN + yN = zN
have a solution in positive integers with N ≥ 3?
• Riemann Hypothesis
About the location of the complex zeroes of the zeta function
ζ(s) ≡
∑
n
1
ns
=
∏
p
1
1− 1
ps
(Here n ranges over positive integers and p ranges over the primes.)
Tells us a lot about the distribution of prime numbers.
• Goldbach Conjecture
Is every even number the sum of two primes?
In each case there is a program that systematically searches for a
counter-example and halts iff it finds it.
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2.8 Crucial Observation
Suppose we are given N programs and want to know which ones halt and
which ones don’t.
N cases of the halting problem is only log2 N bits of information,
not N bits!
They are never independent mathematical facts!
Why not?
Because we could answer all N cases of the halting problem if we knew
exactly how many of the N programs halt. Just run them all in parallel
until exactly the right number halt. The others will never halt.
Now we use this observation to compress all the redundancy out of the
Turing number T and get an algorithmically irreducible number Ω.
2.9 The Halting Probability Ω
Finally Ω = Omega!
Halting Probability:
Ω ≡
∑
p halts
2−|p|
|p| is the size in bits of the program p.
I.e., each k-bit program that halts when run on our standard universal
Turing machine U contributes 1/2k to Ω.
[We need to make U self-delimiting (Section 2.12) to ensure that Ω ≤ 1.
Otherwise the sum for Ω diverges to ∞. By using self-delimiting programs,
we’ve constructed one number, Ω, that extends the trick of Section 2.8’s
crucial observation so that it works for an infinite number of computer
programs, all of them, in fact.]
Now there is absolutely NO redundancy!
The first N bits of Ω answers the halting problem for all programs up to
N bits in size! (Can you see why? Hint: Ω can be computed in the limit
from below.5)
5But very, very slowly, and you can never be sure how close you are.
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2.10 Why is Ω Interesting?
The base-two bits of Ω are irreducible mathematical facts! They can’t
be derived from anything simpler!
The bits of Ω are algorithmically irreducible, algorithmically independent,
and algorithmically random!
Ω is a real number with maximal information content. Each bit of Ω is a
complete surprise! It’s not at all a tame real number like pi = 3.1415926. . .
which only has a finite amount of algorithmic information.
Ω is a dangerous, scary real number! Not good to meet in a dark alley!
Ω is maximally unknowable! Maximum entropy, maximum disorder!
“Ω is a nightmare for the rational mind!”, Karl Svozil.
This makes Ω sound bad, very bad!
On the other hand, Ω is distilled, crystalized mathematical information.
If T is coal, then Ω is a diamond!
In fact, initial segments of Ω are ideal new mathematical axioms.
Knowing a large initial segment of Ω would settle all halting problems for
programs up to that size, which would, to use Charles Bennett’s terminology,
settle all finitely refutable math conjectures up to that complexity.
Ω is concentrated essence of mathematical creativity andmathemat-
ical inspiration! One could measure the progress of mathematics by how
many bits of Ω we can currently determine!6 (Of course this has nothing to
do with moral or scientific progress.)
So Ω can also be regarded as a good friend, instead of an enemy!
6Somewhere Leibniz proposes measuring the intellectual progress of mankind via a
function Φ(t) with the property that all interesting theorems with proofs of size ≤ Φ(t)
are known at time t. Yet another possible measure of human progress is a function Λ(t)
such that all halting problems for programs with ≤ Λ(t) bits have been settled by time
t. Yet perhaps these measures of intellectual progress are all beside the point, the point
being the emergence of new concepts?
The progress measured by Φ is, in principle, merely hard work, and could be achieved
mechanically, by employing vast amounts of computation, assuming that we are exploring
a fixed, static formal theory. But I think that Λ—and counting provable bits in Ω—
measures the emergence of new concepts indirectly via their effects, for surely new
concepts would be needed to advance in these areas.
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2.11 In What Sense is Ω Random?
The bits of Ω are mathematical facts that are true for No Reason,
they’re true by Accident!
Here mathematical truth isn’t Black or White. It’s Grey!
The best way to think about Ω is that each bit of Ω is 0 or 1 with
probability 1/2!
Here God plays dice with mathematical truth!
Knowing all the even bits of Ω wouldn’t help us to get any of the odd
bits of Ω! Knowing the first million bits of Ω wouldn’t help us to get the
million and first bit of Ω! The bits of Ω are just like independent tosses of
a fair coin!
This is the case even though Ω is a specific real number! And even
though each bit of Ω is fully determined mathematically. (Even though we
can’t compute it nor prove what its value is!)
2.12 The Self-Delimiting Universal Computer
U
Actually, the value of Ω depends on the choice of universal computer U .
There are many possible choices!
First of all, U must read one bit of its program p at a time and decide
by itself when to stop reading p before encountering a blank at the end of
p. In other words, each p for U must be self-delimiting.
Also, U must be universal. This means that for any special-purpose
self-delimiting computer C there is a prefix piC such that concatenating it in
front of a program for C gives you a program for U that computes the same
output:
U(piC p) = C(p).
This prefix depends only on the choice of C and not on p. In other words,
U can simulate each C.
26 CHAITIN, FROM PHILOSOPHY TO PROGRAM SIZE
2.13 U is Optimal and Defines ΩU
Then we define the complexity H with respect to C and U as follows:
HC(x) ≡ min
C(p)=x
|p|,
HU(x) ≡ min
U(p)=x
|p|.
H(x) is the size in bits of the smallest program for computing x on each
machine.
Then we have
HU(x) ≤ HC(x) + |piC |.
In other words, programs for U are not too large. For U to simulate C
adds only a fixed number of bits to each program for C.
Then ΩU is defined as follows:
ΩU ≡
∑
U(p) halts
2−|p|.
Any such universal U will do.
2.14 My U is Programmed in LISP
The particular U that I picked to define Ω uses LISP as follows:
U(p) runs U on the binary program p = piβ.
Here p = piβ is a bit string consisting of a high-level algorithm pi followed by
data β. The self-delimiting prefix pi is a LISP expression. The data β is raw
binary data 01101. . . The value of the LISP prefix pi is the output of U(p).
I invented a special version of LISP for writing the prefix pi.
2.15 Programming U in LISP
The LISP expression pi is converted to binary, eight bits per character, and
concatenated with the raw binary data β to produce the binary program for
U , p = piβ.
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Access to the data β is strictly controlled. U reads one bit at a time of
p and CANNOT run off the end of p = piβ. The binary data β must be
self-delimiting, just like the LISP prefix pi, so that U knows when to stop
reading it.
I.e., the alphabet for p is binary, not trinary! There is no blank at end
of p! That would be a wasted character, one that isn’t being used nearly
enough!
There are more details about the LISP implementation in the last lecture
(Day IV).
2.16 Ω and Hilbert’s 10th Problem
We end today’s lecture with a very important application: Hilbert’s 10th
problem.
Does the diophantine equation D(x) = 0 have an unsigned integer solu-
tion?
• ∃D such that D(k,x) = 0 has a solution iff pk halts!
[Matijasevicˇ]
• ∃D such that D(k,x) = 0 has infinitely many solutions
iff the kth bit of Ω is a 1!
[Chaitin]
• ∃D such that D(k,x) = 0 has an even/odd number of solutions
iff the kth bit of Ω is 0/1!
[Ord and Kieu]
For more details, see Ord and Kieu, On the existence of a new family of
Diophantine equations for Ω, http://arxiv.org/abs/math.NT/0301274.
So we get randomness in arithmetic! Ω’s algorithmic random-
ness also infects elementary number theory! The disease is spread-
ing!
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Chapter 3
Day III—Technical Survey of
AIT: Definitions & Theorems
Ω is the jewel of AIT. But it isn’t a diamond solitaire. It’s in a beautiful
setting, which we’ll outline today. We’ll review the key definitions, theorems,
methods and ideas of AIT, but there will beNO proofs! Only proof sketches.
For the proofs, see my book Exploring Randomness.
3.1 Definition of a Self-Delimiting Computer
C
AIT starts with a
Self-delimiting computer C
• C(p) −→ output
• The program p is a bit string.
• The output can be e.g. a LISP S-expression
or a set of S-expressions.
Abstract version of self-delimiting feature:
No extension of a valid program is a valid program. If C(p) is defined then
C is not defined on any extension of p. I.e., the domain of the function C
is a so-called prefix-free set. That’s a set of words in which no word is a
prefix of another.
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3.2 What do we do with C? Define U!
First define the program-size complexity HC(x) to be the size in bits of
the smallest program for C to compute x:
HC(x) ≡ min
C(p)=x
|p|.
Next we construct a universal computer U , for example, as follows:
U(0(Go¨del number for C)1p) = C(p).
In other words, U can simulate C if to each program for C we add a prefix
consisting of a long run of 0’s followed by a 1. This prefix is self-delimiting,
and the number of 0’s in it indicates which C is to be simulated.
Then we have
HU ≤ HC + constant
where
constant = 1 + (Go¨del number for C).
I.e., U ’s programs are, to within an additive constant, minimal in size.
We take this minimality property as our definition for a universal
computer U .
Now somehow pick a particular natural U to use as the basis for
AIT.
In the lecture for Day IV, I will indicate how to use LISP to implement
the particular U that I’ve picked to use as the basis for my theory.
3.3 Does the fact that H depends on U de-
stroy AIT?!
• Some people are exceedingly unhappy that the value of H depends
on the choice of U . But whatever U you pick, the theory goes through.
And Day IV, I actually pick a very simple U .
• And since Ω is an infinite object, all the additive constants that reflect
the choice of U wash out in the limit.
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• Time complexity depends polynomially on the computational model.
But in the case of program-size complexity the dependence on U is only
an additive constant. So the unfashionable field of AIT depends less
on the choice of computer than the fashionable field of time complexity
does! So much for fashion!
• Remember, I do not think that AIT is a practical theory for practical
applications. All theories are lies that help us to see the truth.1
All elegant theories are simplified models of the horrendous
complexity of the chaotic real world. Nevertheless, they give us
insight. You have a choice: elegance or usefulness. You cannot have
both!
• If we knew all the laws of physics, and the world turned out to be a
giant computer, then we could use that computer as U !
3.4 A More Abstract Definition of the Com-
plexity H
I prefer a very down-to-earth concrete approach. But here is a more abstract
“axiomatic” approach to defining H .
Define an abstract complexity measure H via these two properties:
• H(x) is computable in the limit from above.
I.e., {〈x, k〉 : H(x) ≤ k} is r.e.
I.e., H(x) = limt→∞H
t(x).
•
∑
x 2
−H(x) ≤ 1.
Then pick out an optimal minimal H , one with the property that for any
other H ′ there is a constant c such that
H(x) ≤ H ′(x) + c.
This abstract approach works! However I prefer the more concrete
approach in which you think of H(x) as the size of the smallest program
1“Art is a lie that helps us to see the truth,” Pablo Picasso.
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for x. This gives more insight into what is going on. Beware of prema-
ture axiomatization! And beware of excessive abstraction concealing
meaning!
3.5 Back to U—What do we do with U? Def-
initions!
• Individual complexity of an object. Information content of x:
H(x) ≡ min
U(p)=x
|p|.
• Joint complexity of a pair of objects 〈x, y〉:
H(x, y) ≡ min
U(p)=〈x,y〉
|p|.
Size of the smallest program that computes both objects.
• Subadditivity:
H(x, y) ≤ H(x) +H(y) + c.
This was the original reason that I made programs self-delimiting, so
that information content would be additive!2 This meanswe can com-
bine programs for x and y and add c bits and get a program for the
pair 〈x, y〉. For a LISP program that does this and shows that c = 432
is possible, see Section 4.10.
• Algorithmic independence of two objects:
H(x, y) ≈ H(x) +H(y).
I.e., the joint complexity is approximately equal to the sum of the
individual complexities. This means that the two objects have nothing
in common.
2Then I discovered Ω, which cannot be defined unless programs are self-delimiting.
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3.6 AIT Definitions (Continued)
• Mutual information content of two objects:
H(x : y) ≡ H(x) +H(y)−H(x, y).
This is the extent to which it is better to compute them together
rather than separately.
• An elegant program y∗ for y is one that is as small as possible. I.e.,
y∗ has the property that
U(y∗) = y, H(y) = |y∗|, H(U(y∗)) = |y∗|.
• Relative information content H(x|y) of x given an elegant program
y∗ for y, not y directly!
H(x|y) ≡ min
U(p,y∗)=x
|p|.
This is the second main technical idea of AIT. First is to use self-
delimiting programs. Second is to define relative complexity in this
more subtle manner in which we are given y∗ for free, not y, and we
have to compute x.
3.7 Important Properties of These Complex-
ity Measures
• Here is an immediate consequence of our definitions:
H(x, y) ≤ H(x) +H(y|x) + c.
• And here is an important and subtle theorem that justifies our
definitions!
H(x, y) = H(x) +H(y|x) +O(1).
This is an identity in Shannon information theory, with no O(1) term.
In these two different versions of information theory, the formulas look
similar but of course the meaning of H is completely different.
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• Let’s apply this subtle theorem to the mutual information:
H(x : y) ≡ H(x) +H(y)−H(x, y).
We get these two corollaries:
H(x : y) = H(x)−H(x|y) +O(1),
H(x : y) = H(y)−H(y|x) +O(1).
So the mutual information is also the extent to which knowing
one of the two objects helps you to know the other . It was not
at all obvious that this would be symmetric!
Again, these two corollaries are identities in Shannon information the-
ory. They justify our whole approach. When I got these results I knew
that the definitions I had picked for AIT were finally correct!
3.8 Complexity of Bit Strings. Examples.
• High complexity:
H(the most complex N-bit strings) = N +H(N) +O(1)
≈ N + log2 N.
In other words, you have to know how many bits there are plus what
each bit is. And most N -bit strings have H close to the maximum
possible. These are the algorithmically random N -bit strings.
This notion has many philosophical resonances. First, a random
string is one for which there is no theory that obeys Leibniz’s dictum
that a theory must be smaller than what it explains. Leibniz clearly
anticipated this definition of randomness.
Second, a random string is an unexplainable, irrational string, one that
cannot be comprehended, except as “a thing in itself” (Ding an sich),
to use Kantian terminology.
• Low complexity:
Consider the N -bit strings consisting of N 0’s or N 1’s.
H(0N) = H(N) +O(1) ≈ log2 N,
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H(1N) = H(N) +O(1) ≈ log2 N.
For such bit strings, you only need to know how many bits there are,
not what each bit is. These bit strings are not at all random.
• Intermediate complexity:
Consider an elegant program p. I.e., no smaller program makes U
produce the same output.
H(p) = |p|+O(1) if p is an elegant program.
These bit strings are borderline random. Randomness is a matter of
degree, and this is a good place to put the cut-off between random and
non-random strings, if you have to pick a cut-off.
How about infinite bit strings?
3.9 Maximum Complexity Infinite Binary Se-
quences
• Maximum Complexity:
An infinite binary sequence x is defined to be algorithmically random
iff
∃c ∀N [ H(xN) > N − c ].
Here xN is the first N bits of x.
If x is generated by independent tosses of a fair coin, then with probabil-
ity one, x is algorithmically random. But how about specific examples?
• Two Examples of Maximum Complexity:
Ω ≡
∑
U(p) halts
2−|p|
Ω′ ≡
∑
N
2−H(N)
These are algorithmically random real numbers. The initial segments
of their binary expansion always have high complexity.
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From this it follows that Ω and Ω′ aren’t contained in any constructively
definable set of measure zero. In other words, they are statistically
(Martin-Lo¨f) random. Therefore Ω and Ω′ necessarily have any
property held by infinite binary sequences x with probability one. E.g.,
Ω and Ω′ are both Borel normal, for sure, since in general this is
the case with probability one. Borel normal means that in any base,
in the limit all blocks of digits of the same size provably have equal
relative frequency.
That Ω and Ω′ are both Borel normal real numbers can also be proved
directly using a simple program-size argument. This can be done be-
cause, as Shannon information theory already shows, reals that are
not Borel normal are highly redundant and compressible. And the
main difference between Shannon information theory and AIT is that
Shannon’s theory is concerned with average compressions while I am
concerned with compressing individual sequences.
• Why can’t we demand the complexity of initial segments be
even higher?
Because with probability one, infinitely often there have to be long
runs of consecutive zeroes or ones, and this makes the complexity dip
far below the maximum possible [N +H(N)] infinitely often!
3.10 The Algorithmic Probability of x, P (x)
Straight-forward theorems in AIT use program-size arguments.
But the more subtle proofs have to descend one level and use probabilistic
arguments. AIT is an iceberg! Above the water we see program size. But
the bulk of the AIT iceberg is submerged and is the algorithmic probability
P (x)!
PC(x) is defined to be the probability that a program generated by coin-
tossing makes C produce x:
PC(x) ≡
∑
C(p)=x
2−|p|,
P (x) ≡ PU(x) ≡
∑
U(p)=x
2−|p|.
This takes into account all the programs that calculate x, not just the small-
est one.
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3.11 What is the Relationship BetweenH and
P ?
First of all, it’s obvious that
P (x) ≥ 2−H(x)
because one way to compute x is using an elegant program for x. In fact,
much, much more is true:
H(x) = − log2 P (x) +O(1).
This crucial result shows that AIT, at least in so far as the appearance of its
formulas is concerned, is sort of just a version of probability theory in which
we take logarithms and convert probabilities into complexities. In particular,
the important and subtle theorem that
H(x, y) = H(x) +H(y|x) +O(1)
is seen from this perspective as merely an alternative version of the defini-
tion of relative probability:
Pr(x, y) ≡ Pr(x)× Pr(y|x).
How do we establish this crucial relationship between H and P ? By using
an extended version of something called the Kraft inequality, which AIT
inherited from Shannon information theory! [See Section 3.13.]
3.12 Occam’s Razor! There are few elegant
programs!
But first I want to discuss an important corollary of the crucial theorem
H = − log2 P
connecting H(x) and P (x).
This shows that there cannot be too many small programs for x.
In particular, it follows that the number of elegant programs for x is
bounded.
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Also, the number of programs for x whose size is within c bits of H(x) is
bounded by a function that depends only on c and not on x.
This function of c is approximately 2c.
In fact, any program for x whose size is close to H(x) can easily be
obtained from any other such program.
So, what I call Occam’s razor, elegant or nearly elegant programs for x
are essentially unique!
And this justifies our definition of relative complexity H(x|y) and shows
that it does not depend too much on the choice of the elegant program for
y. There are at most O(1) bits difference in H(x|y) depending on the choice
of the y∗ that we are given for free.
3.13 The Extended Kraft Inequality Condi-
tion for Constructing C
The crucial tool used to show that
H(x) = − log2 P (x) +O(1) and H(x, y) = H(x) +H(y|x) +O(1)
is an extended version of the Kraft inequality condition for the existence of
a prefix-free set of words.
In AIT, the Kraft inequality gives us a necessary and sufficient condition
not for the existence of a prefix-free set, as it did in Shannon information
theory, but for the existence of a self-delimiting computer C. Once we have
constructed a special-purpose computer C using the Kraft inequality, we can
then make statements about U by using the fact that
HU ≤ HC + c.
Here’s how we construct C!
Imagine that we have an algorithm for generating an infinite list of re-
quirements:
〈size of program for C, output that we want from C〉
As we generate each requirement 〈s, o〉, we pick the first available s-bit
program p and we assign the output o to C(p). Available means not an
extension or prefix of any previously assigned program for C. This process
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will work and will produce a self-delimiting computer C satisfying all the
requirements iff ∑
over all requirements 〈s, o〉
2−s ≤ 1.
Note that if there are duplicate requirements in the list, then several p will
yield the same output o. I.e., we will have several p with the same value for
C(p).
This way of constructing C may be thought of as a first-fit storage allo-
cation algorithm for one infinitely-divisible unit of storage.
3.14 Three-Level Proofs: Program Size, Prob-
abilities, Geometry
The proof of this crucial version of the Kraft inequality involves simulta-
neously thinking of C as a computer, as an assignment of probabilities to
outputs, and as an assignment of outputs to segments of the unit interval,
segments which are halves, or halves of halves, or halves of halves of halves. . .
It is important to be able to simultaneously keep each of these three
images in ones mind, and to translate from one image to the next depending
on which gives the most insight at any given moment.
In other words, C may be thought of as a kind of constructive probability
distribution, and probability one corresponds to the entire unit interval of
programs, with longer and longer programs corresponding to smaller and
smaller subintervals of the unit interval.
Then the crucial fact that no extension of a valid program is a valid
program simply says that the intervals corresponding to valid programs do
not overlap.
In the last lecture, Day IV, I’ll drop this abstract viewpoint and make
everything very, very concrete by indicating how to program U in LISP and
actually run programs on U . . .
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Chapter 4
Day IV—LISP Implementation
of AIT
The LISP interpreter for Day IV, which is a Java applet that will run in your
web browser, can be found at this URL:
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/unknowable/lisp.html
Note that there is a concise LISP “reference manual” on these web pages,
just below the windows for input to and output from the interpreter.
4.1 Formal Definition of the Complexity of a
Formal Theory
Before starting with LISP, let me finish some things I started in the last
lecture, and also answer some questions that were raised about that lecture.
First of all, I never stated the formal version of the incompleteness results
about Ω that I explained informally in Day II.
How can we measure the complexity of a formal mathematical
theory in bits of information?
H(formal math theory) ≡
the size in bits |p| of the smallest (self-delimiting!) program p
such that
U(p) = {the infinite set of all the theorems in the theory}.
41
42 CHAITIN, FROM PHILOSOPHY TO PROGRAM SIZE
Note that this is something new: U is now performing an unending
computation and produces an infinite amount of output!
smallest p −→ U −→ {theorems}
The rather abstract point of view taken here is in the spirit of Emil Post’s
1944 paper R.e. sets of positive integers and their decision problems. For our
purposes the internal details of the formal theory are irrelevant. We are flying
high in the sky looking down at the formal theory. We’re so high up that we
don’t care about the axioms and rules of inference used in the theory. We
can’t see all of that detail. Nevertheless, using these very general methods
we can make some rather strong statements about the power of the formal
theory in question.
4.2 Formal Statement of the Incompleteness
Theorem for Ω
A formal math theory T with complexity N cannot enable you to
determine more than N + c bits of the numerical value of Ω (base-
two).
Here are some hints about the proof. We make the tacit hypothesis, of
course, that all the theorems proved in theory T are true. Otherwise T is of
no interest.
The proof is in two parts.
• First of all you show that
H(ΩK) > K − constant.
This follows from the fact that knowing ΩK , the first K bits of Ω,
enables you to answer the halting problem for all programs for U up
to K bits in size.
• Now that you know that ΩK has high complexity, in the second half of
the proof you use this fact to derive a contradiction from the assumption
that the formal theory T enables you to determine much more than
H(T ) bits of Ω. Actually, it makes no difference whether these are
consecutive bits of Ω or are scattered about in the base-two expansion
of Ω.
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This, our major incompleteness result about Ω, actually requires very
little of the machinery presented in Day III. In fact, the proof is a straight-
forward program-size argument that makes no use of P nor of the the Kraft
inequality. This is in fact the self-contained elementary proof that I give in
my 1998 Springer volume The Limits of Mathematics, which is the reference
volume for today’s lecture.
4.3 Mutual Information is Program Size?
I was asked a question about mutual information.
Day III we defined the following complexity measures:
• H(x) (absolute, individual) information,
• H(x, y) joint information,
• H(x|y) relative information,
• H(x : y) mutual information.
The fourth complexity measure in this list, mutual information, is actually
rather different from the other three. It isn’t the size of a computer
program! Instead it’s defined to be
H(x) +H(y)−H(x, y).
Well, you could try to make mutual information into the size of a program.
E.g., mutual information could be defined to be the size of the largest (not
the smallest!) possible common subroutine shared by elegant programs for x
and y.1
Unfortunately this alternative definition, which is much more intuitive
than the one I actually use, doesn’t seem to fit into AIT too well. Perhaps
someone can find a way to make it work! Can you?
This is an interesting question to answer because of an important possible
application: In Section 1.14, Day I, it was suggested that mutual information
be used to try to partition the world into separate living organisms.
1For other possibilites, see the section on common information in my 1979 paper
Toward a mathematical definition of “life.”
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4.4 How do you actually make things self-
delimiting?!
Is
H(N -bit string) ≤ N + constant?
No, it can’t be, because programs for U have to be self-delimiting. Programs
have to indicate their size as well as their content.
Let’s look at some examples of how this can be done. How can we make
an N -bit string self-delimiting? Well, 2N + 2 bits will certainly do. There’s
a special-purpose self-delimiting computer C that accomplishes this:
HC(N -bit string) ≤ 2N + 2.
C reads two bits of its program at a time as long as they are the same, then
stops reading its program and outputs one bit from each pair of identical
twins that it read. So
C(00 00 11 01) −→ 001.
Therefore
H(N -bit string) ≡ HU(N -bit string) ≤ HC(N -bit string) + c ≤ 2N + c
′.
A more complicated C reads a program that starts with a doubled and there-
fore self-delimiting version of the base-two numeral for N followed by the N
bits of the bit string. This shows that
H(N -bit string) ≤ 2 log2 N +N + c.
A more elaborate procedure is to have two “headers” at the beginning of
the program. The first one uses the bit-doubling trick to indicate the size of
the second header, and the second header gives N in binary directly, with no
bits doubled. That gives an upper bound of
H(N -bit string) ≤ O(loglogN) + log2 N +N.
You can go on like this using more and more headers and getting more and
more complicated upper bounds. To short-circuit this process, just go back
to using a single header, and make it an elegant program for N . That gives
H(N -bit string) ≤ H(N) +N +
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and this upper bound is, in general, best possible.
So we’ve just seen four different examples of how a self-delimiting program
can tell us its size as well as its contents.
Another version of the principle that a program tells us its size as well as
its contents is the fact that an elegant program tells us its size as well as its
output, so
H(x) = H(x,H(x)) +O(1).
This is one formula in AIT that is totally unlike anything in Shannon infor-
mation theory.
That’s all the unfinished business from Day III! Now let’s start
Day IV proper by explaining LISP!
4.5 What is LISP?
LISP = LISt Processing. Lists are arbitrarily long nested tuples, and may
have repeated elements.
LISP is like a computerized version of set theory!
The LISP S-expression
((A bc) 39 x-y-z)
denotes the following nested tuples:
〈〈A, bc〉, 39, x-y-z〉
Programs and data in LISP are always S-expressions. Everything is an S-
expression! The S in S-expression stands for Symbolic.
S-expressions that are not lists are called atoms. A, bc, 39 and x-y-z
are the atoms in the above S-expression. The empty list () = 〈〉 is also an
atom, usually denoted by nil.
LISP is a functional programming language, not an imperative program-
ming language.
LISP is an expression language. There is no notion of time, there are no
GOTO’s, and there are no assignment statements!2
LISP programs are expressions that you evaluate, not run, and they yield
a value, with NO side-effect! (This is called “Pure” LISP!)
2Well, they’re actually present, but only indirectly, only subliminally!
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Functional Notation in LISP:
f(x, y) is written (f x y)
So
(1 + 2)× 3
becomes
(* (+ 1 2) 3)
in LISP. Prefix notation, not infix notation! Full parenthesization! Fixed
number of arguments for each primitive function!
In my LISP most parentheses are understood, are implicit, and are then
supplied by the LISP interpreter.
Complete LISP Example. Factorial programmed in my LISP:
define (f n)
if = n 0 1
* n (f - n 1)
With all the parentheses supplied, factorial becomes:
(define (f n)
(if (= n 0) 1
(* n (f (- n 1)))
))
In words, f is defined to be a function of one argument, n. And if n = 0,
then f(n) is 1. If not, f(n) is n× f(n− 1).
Then (f 4) yields value 24, as expected, since 4× 3× 2× 1 = 24.
Dissecting and Reassembling Lists:
Finally I should mention that car gives you the first element of a list, cdr
gives you the rest of the list, and cons inverts car and cdr.
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4.6 LISP Program-Size Complexity
You can get a toy version of AIT by using LISP program size!
Define an elegant LISP expression to be one with the property that no
smaller LISP expression yields the same value.
In order to measure size properly, LISP expressions are written in a canon-
ical standard notation with no embedded comments and with exactly one
blank separating successive elements of a list.
Then the LISP complexity of an S-expression is defined to be the size
in characters of an elegant expression with that particular value.
Next represent a formal mathematical theory in LISP as a LISP S-expression
whose evaluation never terminates and which uses the primitive function dis-
play to output each theorem.
display is an identity function with the side-effect of displaying its operand
and is normally used for debugging large LISP S-expressions that give the
wrong value.
Theorem—
A formal mathematical theory with LISP complexity N cannot
enable you to prove that a LISP expression is elegant if the elegant
expression’s size is greater than N + 410 characters!
This is a very concrete, down-to-earth incompleteness theorem! In that
direction, it’s the best I can do!
The reductio ad absurdum proof consists of N + 410 characters of LISP
that define a function, and that apply this function to a quoted form of the
N -character LISP expression that generates all the theorems of the formal
theory. The first step is to measure the size N of the LISP expression that
generates all the theorems. Then use TRY (Section 4.7) to run the theory
for longer and longer, until a provably elegant expression is found whose size
is greater than N +410. When this happens, evaluate the provably elegant
expression and return its value as our value.
So we’ve described an N + 410 character LISP expression whose value
is the same as the value of an elegant expression that is larger than it is!
Contradiction!
48 CHAITIN, FROM PHILOSOPHY TO PROGRAM SIZE
4.7 How Does TRY work?
TRY plays the fundamental role in my LISP that eval plays in traditional,
normal LISP. It enables you to try to evaluate a given expression for a limited
or unlimited amount of time, and giving it raw binary data on the side, which
it must access in a self-delimiting manner. Also, display’s from within the
expression are captured, thus giving a mechanism for an S-expression to
produce an infinite amount of output, not just a final value.
try time-limit/no-time-limit expression binary-data
TRY has the three arguments shown above.
The first argument is either an integer or no-time-limit. The second
argument is an arbitrary LISP S-expression. The third argument is a bit
string represented in LISP as a list (...) of 0’s and 1’s separated by blanks.
TRY then yields this triple:
(success/failure
value-of-expression/out-of-time/out-of-data
(list of captured displays from within expression...))
Also, within the expression that is being tried, you can use read-bit or
read-exp to get access to the binary data in a self-delimiting manner, either
one bit or one LISP S-expression at a time.
TRY is like a large suitcase: I am using it to do several different things
at the same time. In fact, TRY is all I really need to be able to program
AIT in LISP. All of the other changes in my version of LISP were made just
for the fun of it! (Actually, to simplify LISP as much as possible without
ruining its power, so that I could prove theorems about it and at the same
time enjoy programming in it!)
Example: If you’re trying to run an unending computation that is a
formal theory written in LISP as described in Section 4.6, then TRY always
returns
(failure out-of-time (list of theorems...))
The size of the list of theorems depends on how much time the TRY was
given to run the formal theory.
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4.8 LISP Program for Our Standard Univer-
sal Computer U
define (U p)
cadr try no-time-limit
’eval read-exp
p
This function U of p returns the second element of the list returned by
TRY, a TRY with no time limit that tries to evaluate a LISP expression at
the beginning of p, while making the rest of p available as raw binary data.
Here the program p for U is a bit string that is represented in LISP as a
list of 0’s and 1’s separated by blanks. E.g., p = (0 1 1 0 1...)
Let me explain this!
The binary program p consists of a LISP S-expression prefix (converted
into a bit string), that is followed by a special delimiter character, the ASCII
newline control character (also converted to bits), and that is then followed
by raw binary data.
The newline character adds 8 bits to the program p, but guarantees that
the prefix be self-delimiting. Each character in the LISP prefix is given in p
as the corresponding 8 ASCII bits.
Within the prefix, read-bit and read-exp enable you to get access to
the raw binary data, either one bit or one LISP S-expression at a time. But
you must not run off the end of the binary data! That aborts everything! If
so, U of p returns out-of-data.
So the program for the universal U consists of a high-level language algo-
rithmic part followed by data, raw binary data. The algorithmic part indi-
cates which special-purpose self-delimiting computer C should be simulated,
and the raw binary data gives the binary program for C!
I believe that I’ve picked a very natural U .
4.9 Running U on Simple Examples
Here’s our first example of a program for U . This program is all LISP prefix
with no binary data. The prefix is ’(a b c).
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run-utm-on
bits ’ ’(a b c)
This yields (a b c).
And here’s a program with one bit of binary data. The prefix is read-bit
and the data is 0.
run-utm-on
append bits ’read-bit
’(0)
This yields 0.
Let’s change the data bit. Now the prefix is read-bit and the data is 1.
run-utm-on
append bits ’read-bit
’(1)
This yields 1.
run-utm-on is a macro that expands to the definition of U , which is cadr
try no-time-limit ’eval read-exp.
Also note that when bits converts a LISP S-expression into a bit string
(a list of 0’s and 1’s) it automatically adds the newline character required by
read-exp.
4.10 Subadditivity Revisited
cons eval read-exp
cons eval read-exp
nil
This is a 432-bit prefix pi for U with the property that
U(pi x∗ y∗) = (x y) = 〈x, y〉.
Here x∗ is an elegant program for x and y∗ is an elegant program for y.
Therefore
H(x, y) ≤ H(x) +H(y) + 432!
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For years and years I used this inequality without having the faintest idea
what the value of the constant might be! It’s nice to know that there is a
natural choice for U that can be easily programmed in LISP and for which
c = 432! That’s a little bit like dreaming of a woman for years and then
actually meeting her! That’s also how I feel about now having a version of
U that I can actually run code on!
My book The Limits of Mathematics programs in LISP all the proofs of
my incompleteness results, in particular, all the key results about Ω. And my
book Exploring Randomness programs in LISP all the proofs of the results
presented Day III. That’s a lot of LISP programming, but I enjoyed it a lot!
Some of these programs are fun to read, and it’s educational to do so,
but I probably went overboard! In general, I would say that you are better off
programming something yourself, rather than reading someone else’s code, if
you really want to understand what’s going on! There is no substitute for
doing it yourself, your own way, if you really want to understand something.
After all, that’s how I came up with AIT and my alternative approach to
Go¨del incompleteness in the first place, because I was dissatisfied with the
usual approach!
4.11 Some Open Problems for Future Research
• There is a cottage industry of highly-technical work on subtle properties
of Ω and to what extent other numbers share these properties. [See
Delahaye, “Les nombres ome´ga,” Pour la Science, May 2002, pp. 98–
103 and Calude, Information and Randomness, Springer, 2002.]
• Much work remains to be done on the complexity H(X) for infinite
sets X. This is important because of the case when
X = {the set of theorems of a formal theory T}.
For example, the relationship between the algorithmic complexityH(X)
and the algorithmic probability P (X) is not completely known. When
dealing with infinite computations in AIT, in some cases it is not even
clear whether the definitions that were chosen are the right ones! [For
more on this, see the last chapter of my Exploring Randomness.]
• As I stated above, meta-mathematics and the incompleteness results
I’ve presented in this course are a static framework in which one stud-
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ies the power of a fixed set of axioms and rules of inference. How about
a dynamic theory that has something to say about the emergence
of new mathematical concepts? Is such a meta-theory possible?3
• I would like to see an abstract mathematical theory defining “life” and
predicting its emergence and evolution under very general circum-
stances.
• Is the physical universe discrete or continuous? Starting from black
hole thermodynamics, a “holographic” principle has emerged which
states that the information content of any physical system is only a
finite number of bits and grows with the surface area of that system,
not with its volume. [See Smolin, Three Roads to Quantum Gravity.]
It will be interesting to see if and in what form these ideas survive.
• I think that AIT is largely sketched out and only highly technical ques-
tions remain. I personally am more interested in attempting new the-
ories of life or intelligence. This however will not be easy to do.
I’ve greatly enjoyed this Winter School and my visit to Estonia!
Thank you very much for inviting me!
3In this connection, see footnote 6 on page 24.
Additional Reading
The six papers listed here were the handouts that accompanied my lectures
at EWSCS ’03. The two books listed below provide the reference material
for the course, including complete proofs for all the theorems that I stated
here, and a detailed explanation of my version of LISP.
• Day I—Philosophical Necessity of AIT
– G. Chaitin, “Two philosophical applications of algorithmic infor-
mation theory,” Proc. of DMTCS ’03, Springer-Verlag, to appear.
http://arxiv.org/abs/math.HO/0302333
– G. Chaitin, “On the intelligibility of the universe and the notions
of simplicity, complexity and irreducibility.”
Presented at the XIX. Deutscher Kongreß fu¨r Philosophie, Gren-
zen und Grenzu¨berschreitungen [German Philosophy Congress on
Limits and Transcending Limits], 23.–27. September 2002 in Bonn.
http://arxiv.org/abs/math.HO/0210035
• Day II—Main Application of AIT: Incompleteness
– G. Chaitin, “Paradoxes of randomness,” Complexity, vol. 7, no. 5,
pp. 14–21, 2002.
• Day III—Technical Survey of AIT: Definitions & Theorems
– G. Chaitin, “Meta-mathematics and the foundations of mathe-
matics,” Bulletin EATCS, vol. 77, pp. 167–179, 2002.
– G. Chaitin, Exploring Randomness, Springer-Verlag, London, 2001.
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• Day IV—LISP Implementation of AIT
– G. Chaitin, “Elegant LISP programs,” in C. S. Calude, ed., People
and Ideas in Theoretical Computer Science, pp. 32–52. Springer-
Verlag, Singapore, 1999.
– G. Chaitin, “An invitation to algorithmic information theory,” in
D. S. Bridges, C. S. Calude, J. Gibbons, S. Reeves, I. H. Witten,
eds., Combinatorics, Complexity & Logic: Proc. of DMTCS ’96,
pp. 1–23. Springer-Verlag, Singapore, 1997.
– [The above two papers are both chapters in]
G. Chaitin, The Limits of Mathematics, Springer-Verlag, Singa-
pore, 1998.
The papers listed here are also available at the author’s website:
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin
LISP code for my two books may be found at
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/ait
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/lm.html
The LISP interpreter is at
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/unknowable/lisp.html
